We analyse the security of iterated hash functions that compute an input dependent checksum which is processed as part of the hash computation. We show that a large class of such schemes, including those using non-linear or even one-way checksum functions, is not secure against the second preimage attack of Kelsey and Schneier, the herding attack of Kelsey and Kohno and the multicollision attack of Joux. Our attacks also apply to a large class of cascaded hash functions. Our second preimage attacks on the cascaded hash functions improve the results of Joux presented at Crypto'04. We also apply our attacks to the MD2 and GOST hash functions. Our second preimage attacks on the MD2 and GOST hash functions improve the previous best known short-cut second preimage attacks on these hash functions by factors of at least 2 26 and 2 54 , respectively. Our herding and multicollision attacks on the hash functions based on generic checksum functions (e.g., one-way) are a special case of the attacks on the cascaded iterated hash functions previously analysed by Dunkelman and Preneel and are not better than their attacks. On hash functions with easily invertible checksums, our multicollision and herding attacks (if the hash value is short as 
Introduction

Background
Cryptographic hash functions are important tools of cryptology used in many applications for secure and efficient information processing. Hash functions are expected to resist collision and (second) preimage attacks to provide security in such applications. Furthermore, they are often assumed to behave "randomly". In practice, the requirement of these security properties depends entirely on the application.
For efficiency reasons, iterated hash functions are used in many real-life applications. The Merkle-Damgård construction [3, 21] (MD construction in the rest of this article) is the most commonly used iterated hash function framework to design hash functions; almost all widely used hash functions follow this framework. Given a fixed input length collision-resistant compression function, a variable input length collision-resistant hash function can be designed using this framework.
A number of so-called generic attacks on the MD construction have shown that this construction does not satisfy some expected security properties. This structure is not as resistant to second preimage attacks as an ideal hash function as shown by Dean [4] and Kelsey and Schneier [14] , and it also has other undesired weaknesses in the form of multicollisions [11] and herding attacks [13] .
Our work
In this paper, we study the security of iterated hash functions that use checksums with respect to the generic attacks of [11, 13, 14] , on the MD construction. For a long time, checksums have been sought for use in iterated hash functions aiming to increase the security of the overall hash function without significantly degrading its efficiency. Hence, it is desirable that a checksum function is at least as fast as the compression function itself. Applications may even require checksum to be much faster than the compression function so that the speed of the total hash function construction approximates that of the hash function without checksum. The hash function proposal of Quisquater and Girault [28] , which uses an additive checksum, and the MD2 hash function of Rivest [29] , which uses a non-linear checksum, are some earlier checksum-based hash functions.
In this class of hash functions, a checksum is computed using the message and/or intermediate hash values and subsequently appended to the message, which is then processed using the hash function. If H is a MD hash function, then we define a checksum-based hash constructionH to process a message m byH (m) = H (m C(m)), where C is the checksum function computed over m. Our notation is slightly inaccurate, as padding of the message is ignored. However, the attacks presented later in this paper do not rely on any specific padding rule, and hence we shall be using this notation repeatedly. We let the sizes of the hash and checksum states be n and d bits, respectively. The hash value ofH is also n bits. The function C could be as simple as an XOR of its inputs as in 3C [8] , a modular addition as in GOST [31] , a simple non-linear function as in MD2 [12] or some complex one-way function such as the SHA-1 [25, 26] compression function. An example construction using SHA-1 as the checksum function for the SHA-256 hash function [25, 26] is defined by SHA256(m SHA1(m)), which we shall return to later. Similarly, instantiation of the 3C construction using SHA-256 compression function is called 3C-SHA-256.
In this paper, we analyse a general class of checksumbased hash functions that can be defined asH (m) = H (m C(m)) with respect to the generic attacks of [11, 13, 14] , where the checksum function C can be linear, non-linear or even one-way (hard to invert: inverting C requires about 2 d evaluations). Our attacks on the constructionH are summarised as follows:
1. The constructionH with any checksum including oneway checksum succumbs to the long-message second preimage attack of [14] and herding attack of [13] whenever d < n. 2. More efficient second preimage and herding attacks work on the constructionH having a linear or non-linear but easily invertible C (C may be inverted in 1 evaluation) whenever d < 2n − 2. 3. Multicollisions on the constructionH for any checksum function when d ≤ n. If the checksum function is easily invertible, multicollisions can be found forH independently of the size of d.
We note that a checksum-based hash function can also be viewed as a cascaded construction in which the hash values of the hash functions in the cascade are combined and processed in the end. That is, by using the compression function of one of the hash functions in the cascaded hash function as a checksum function, a cascaded construction can be turned into the checksum-based hashH . Hence, our attacks on the constructionH also apply to the cascade of two independent hash functions H and G defined by H (m) G(m) [27] . Similarly, our attacks easily extend to complex looking cascaded structures of form H (m) G(m H (m)) [11, Sect. 4 .3].
Related work
Coppersmith [2] presented a short-cut collision attack on a 128-bit hash function based on the DES algorithm proposed by Quisquater and Girault [28] which processes two supplementary checksum blocks each computed independently using XOR and modular addition of message blocks. Joux [11] provided a technique to find 2 k -collisions for a MD hash function for only about k times as much work as is required for a collision, and uses this technique to attack cascade hashes. Gauravaram and Kelsey [7] analysed the security of the variants of MD hash functions that compute linear-XOR or additive checksums over message blocks, intermediate hash values, or both, and process these checksums in computing the final hash value. Dunkelman and Preneel [5] analysed the security of general iterated hash functions called "concatenated schemes" (also called cascaded constructions). Nandi and Stinson [23] have shown the applicability of multicollision attacks to a variant of MD in which each message block is processed multiple times; Hoch and Shamir [10] extended the results of [23] showing that generalised sequential hash functions with any fixed repetition of message blocks do not resist multicollision attacks.
The MD2 hash function [12] uses a non-linear checksum function. Vulnerabilities in MD2 have been exposed through collision attacks on its compression function [15, 30] and (second) preimage attacks on the full hash function [15, 16, 22] by exploiting weaknesses in its compression function. Mendel, Pramstaller and Rechberger [20] presented a short-cut (second) preimage attack on the 256-bit GOST hash function for a target message of at least 257 message blocks in 2 192 evaluations of the compression function. 
Herding attack of [13] 
Comparison with prior work
The attack techniques presented in this paper when combined with the long-message second preimage attack of [14] improve the second preimage attack of Joux [11] on the cascaded hash functions whose complexity is upper bounded by the brute-force second preimage attack on the strongest hash function (the one with the largest hash value) in the cascade. Our second preimage attacks on the GOST and MD2 hash functions improve significantly over the previous attacks of [20] and [15, 16, 22] , respectively. Gauravaram and Kelsey [7] have shown that the variants of MD hash functions that compute linear-XOR or additive checksums gain almost no security against the long-message second preimage attacks of [4, 14] and the herding attack of [13] . We analyse more general cases of the checksum function (e.g., non-linear and one-way functions) applied to the MD hash functions by extending the methods of [7] . Dunkelman and Preneel [5] analysed the security of more general iterated hash functions called "concatenated schemes" (also called cascaded constructions). Dunkelman and Preneel have proposed herding and multicollision attacks on this class of hash functions and left open the security of these hash functions against the second preimage attacks. The checksum-based hash functions analysed in our paper are the special cases of the concatenated iterated hash functions studied in [5] . Our second preimage attack on the cascaded hash functions solves the open question raised by Dunkelman and Preneel [5] . The herding and multicollision attacks of [5] also apply to the hash functions based on checksums. The complexity of our herding attack on the cascaded and checksum-based hash functions is not faster than the attack of [5] (herding attack on MD2 is an exception). In addition, our multicollision attack on the hash functions based on generic checksum function (e.g., one-way checksum function) has similar complexity to the attack of [5] . On hash functions with easily invertible checksums, our multicollision attack is more efficient than that of [5] . A clear and explicit comparison of our results with those of Joux [11] for the second preimage attacks and with those of Dunkelman and Preneel [5] for the herding and multicollision attacks is provided later in the paper.
We summarise the state of the art of hash functions using checksums in Table 1 by combining our results with those of Dunkelman and Preneel [5] . Table 1 shows the sizes of the checksum function compared with the hash value sizes for which there are attacks better than brute force depending on whether checksum function is easily invertible or one-way.
Implications of our work
Our results have implications to the security of the 128-bit MD2 hash function [12] designed by Rivest, and the Russian standard GOST hash function [31] . Given a target message of 2 64 128-bit blocks, we find second preimages for MD2 in 2 71 evaluations of its compression function improving the previous work of 2 73 based on a recent preimage attack [16] . Similarly, for a target message of 2 128 256-bit blocks, our techniques can find second preimages for GOST in about 2 137 evaluations of its compression function in comparison with the previous short-cut attack of 2 192 [20] . The long-message second preimage attacks on some specific checksum-based hash functions are summarised in Tables 2 and 3 . Our second preimage attacks on the MD2 and GOST hash functions are faster than the previous best known attacks for only the challenged target messages of sizes at least as large as indicated in Column 2 of Table 2 . The other hash functions in Table 2 specify an upper bound on the length of the messages (at most 2 64 − 1 bits) to be hashed close to the values as indicated in Column 2. Table 3 summarises the analytical results of the herding attack on these hash functions. Our second preimage and herding attacks require abundant memory as shown later in Sect. 6 of the paper. [5] . In Sect. 8, we discuss the application of cryptanalytic collision attacks on hash functions to carry out generic attacks on the checksum-based hash functions. In Sect. 9, we conclude the paper with some open questions.
Cryptographic hash functions
Cryptographic hash functions process an arbitrary length message into a fixed length hash value. Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n be an n-bit hash function. Informally, three wellknown attacks on H are: For an ideal H , the complexities of the collision and (second) preimage attacks are 2 n/2 and 2 n , respectively. These complexities are measured in terms of evaluations of H . These attacks are generic in the sense that they apply to any hash function independently of how it is designed.
Merkle-Damgård hash functions
Most iterated hash functions used in practice such as MD5 [29] , SHA-1 [24] and SHA-256 [25, 26] follow the MD hash function framework. An n-bit MD hash function H , as illustrated in Fig. 1 , works as follows: assume that H can process a message m with a maximum length of 2 N bits. The message is padded to a length which is a multiple of b in bits. The padding includes the binary encoding of the length of the original message in the last N bits. This technique of including the length of the message in the padding is known as MD strengthening [17] . The message m is then partitioned into t message blocks m[i], 1 ≤ i ≤ t, each b bits long. Each block is processed using a fixed input length compression function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} b → {0, 1} n . The compression function iteration is defined by
where
is the hash value H (m). The hash construction H preserves the collision resistance of the compression function f due to the inclusion of the MD strengthening. For an ideal n-bit hash function H , it requires about 2 n/2 evaluations of f to find a collision and 2 n evaluations of f to find (second) preimages for an ideal n-bit compression function f .
The following attacks apply to an n-bit MD hash function H and are generic to the iterated hash functions even if their compression functions are ideal.:
This attack takes about k2 n/2 evaluations of f . 2. Long-message second preimage attack [14] : Given a message m of approximately 2 k message blocks and
This attack requires about k2 n/2 + 2 n−k evaluations of f . 3. Herding attack [13] : Construct a binary tree structure for H with 2 k random hash values at the leaves, and the hash value H T at the root. For each node in the tree, there is a message block that maps the hash value at that node to the hash value at the parent. Commit to H t . Later, when some relevant information m is available, construct a message m using m , the precomputed tree structure and some online computations such that H (m) = H t . It takes about 2 n/2+k/2+2 offline evaluations of f to compute the tree structure and 2 n−k evaluations of f to construct m.
Hash functions using checksums
Hash functions that use checksums process an arbitrary length message using two chains: a hash chain where a compression function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} b → {0, 1} n is iterated, and a checksum chain where a checksum function In the end, when the entire message has been processed in both the chains, the checksum is processed as an additional message block in the hash chain.
For an easy presentation of analysis later in the paper, we consider schemes that compute checksums using only message blocks. In fact, this implies no loss of generality if one assumes that the checksum function knows the IV of the hash chain, since the checksum function may then perform the exact same computations as those done in the hash chain. As a result, our analysis can be easily modified to the case of checksum computation using intermediate hash values, or both message blocks and intermediate hash values. Wherever applicable, we remark these extensions in this paper. In addition, for ease of exposition, we limit the discussion to checksums of size at most one message block -hence, d ≤ b. Our attacks described later in the paper also work when d > b (but the complexity of the attack often depends on the concrete value of d).
Let H be an n-bit hash function iterated over the compression function f . Now, an n-bit checksum-based hash function may be described as
We repeat that this is a slight abuse of notation due to padding, but we ignore this difference in the following. In the description of the attacks, we do not care about padding, except that in the second preimage attack we make sure that the second preimage produced has the right length (same as the first preimage). It is a simple matter to account for padding in our attacks.
XOR/additive checksum variants of MD
A number of variant constructions have been proposed that augment the MD construction by computing some kind of XOR/additive checksum on the message bits and/or intermediate hash values and providing the XOR/additive checksum as a final block for the hash function. In the following sections, we define some XOR/additive checksum variants of MD that have appeared in the literature.
3C hash function and its variants
The 3C construction maintains twice the size of the hash value for its intermediate states using a hash chain and a checksum chain as shown in Fig. 3 . In its hash chain, a compression function f with a block size b is iterated in the MD mode. In its checksum chain, the checksum C[t] is computed by XORing all the intermediate states each of size n bits. The construction assumes that b > n. At any iteration i, the checksum value is i j=1 H j . The hash value H t is computed by processing C[t] padded with 0 bits to make the final data block pad(C[t]) using the last compression function. 4 The GOST hash function A 3-chain variant of 3C called 3CM is used as a chaining scheme in the Maelstrom-0 hash function [6] . At every iteration of f in the hash chain of 3CM, the n-bit value in the third chain is updated using an LFSR. This result is then XORed with the data in the hash chain at that iteration. All the intermediate hash values in the hash chain of 3CM are XORed in the second chain. Finally, the hash value is obtained by concatenating the data in the second and third chains and processing it using the last f function. F-Hash [18] , another variant of 3C, computes the hash value by XORing part of the output of the compression function at every iteration and then processes it as a checksum block using the last compression function.
GOST hash function
GOST is a 256-bit hash function specified in the Russian standard GOST R 34.11 [31] . The compression function f of GOST is iterated in the MD mode, and a mod 2 256 additive checksum is computed by adding all the 256-bit message blocks in the checksum chain.
An arbitrary length message m to be processed using GOST is split into b-bit blocks m [1] 
Our example one-way checksum variant of MD
We now define a 256-bit checksum-based hash function which will be used as a running example throughout this paper. We stress that this is not a proposal.
Definition 1 The checksum-based hash functionH is defined as
H(m) = SHA256(m SHA1(m)).
This construction may be seen as a checksum-based extension of the SHA-256 hash function, where the checksum function is the SHA-1 compression function. We shall not make use of any short-cut attacks on these hash functions in this paper. We assume that the compression functions of SHA-256 and SHA-1 take similar amounts of time to evaluate. The hash functions SHA-256 and SHA-1 hash messages of a maximum length of 2 64 − 1 bits [25, 26] , which is close to 2 55 512-bit blocks. Hence, while illustrating our attacks, we often consider that these hash functions hash messages of about 2 55 blocks.
Some definitions
At every iteration i in the hash computation ofH (m), the checksum function C updates a checksum state as given by For example, the XOR checksum function in 3C, 3CM and F-Hash, and the additive checksum function in GOST are invertible and linkable in time T = 1. The non-linear checksum function of MD2 is also invertible and linkable in time T = 1 [22] . In addition, the invertible non-linear checksum of MD2 can be computed in time equivalent to about 1/52 ≈ 2 −5.7 compression function evaluations. We shall use these facts later in the paper. We shall also often assume that C and f take a similar amount of time to evaluate.
Checksum control sequences
We will use a cryptanalytic tool which we call checksum control sequence (CCS) to extend a generic attack 1 on an iterated hash function H to the checksum-based hash constructionH = H (m C(m)). We define CCS as a data structure which lets us control the checksum value ofH , without altering the rest of the hash computation. We construct the CCS by building a Joux multicollision [11] of the correct size using a brute-force collision search. It is important to note that the CCS is not itself a single string which is hashed; instead, it is a data structure which permits us to construct one of a very large number of possible strings, each of which has some effect on the checksum but leaves the remainder of the hash computation unchanged. That is, the choice of a piece of the message from the CCS affects the checksum chain, but not the hash chain, of theH hash. Thus, CCS enables us to produce a message with any desired checksum, such that the checksum has, in effect, been defeated and allows the generic attack to work on the hash functionH .
The CCS has two algorithms associated with it: a CCS construction algorithm and a CCS searching algorithm. Our CCS algorithms are generic and can defeat checksum values computed using a wide range of checksum functions. We also present very specific CCS algorithms that can be used to defeat only simple checksums such as linear checksums. The complexities to construct and use a specific CCS to defeat linear checksums are sometimes better than the generic CCS algorithms to defeat linear checksums; for example, defeating XOR checksums as in 3C using our specific CCS algorithm is faster than the generic one.
Constructing the CCS
Given some intermediate hash value H iv , the CCS forH is constructed as follows.
Algorithm.
1. Produce a 2 d -collision over 1-block messages on the hash chain ofH with H iv as its IV using the multicollision method of [11] ignoring its impact on the checksum chain. 2 2. The checksum computed over at least one of the 2 d messages in the multicollision for H is expected to be equal to some (at this point unknown) target checksum value C t . All 2 d messages in the CCS produce the same intermediate hash value H CCS .
Complexity. Constructing the CCS takes about d ×2 n/2 evaluations of the compression function.
Remark 1
If the checksum inH is computed using intermediate hash values, then a 2 d -collision over multiblock messages (e.g., two-block messages) on its hash chain has to be produced to construct the CCS.
Searching the CCS
Once a CCS is constructed, a generic attack may be carried out on H from the end of the CCS. To extend this generic attack onto the constructionH , a message in the CCS with the right checksum C t must be found by searching the CCS. We provide the following two techniques to find such a message depending on the difficulty of inverting the checksum function C.
Exploiting the structure of messages
If C is not easily invertible, e.g., SHA-1 inH, we can exploit the structure of the messages in the CCS to find the right message. This takes about 2 d+1 evaluations of the checksum function C. This is a direct application of Joux' collision attack on the cascaded hash functions [11] .
Meet-in-the-middle attack
If C is easily invertible, as the C in MD2, GOST and 3C, one may perform a meet-in-the-middle attack on the message blocks in the CCS as follows: Algorithm. Let the initial checksum be C iv , and the target checksum be C t . 
CCS algorithms to defeat linear checksums
Specific CCS algorithms can be constructed and used to defeat XOR and additive checksums. The XOR and additive checksums can be controlled more efficiently using specific algorithms than the generic algorithms described in Sect. 4.2. For example, a 2 k -collision on the underlying MD construction of 3C, in which the sequence of individual collisions, each two message blocks long, gives us a choice of 2 k different sequences of message blocks that might appear at the beginning of this message. When we want a particular k-bit checksum value, we can turn the problem of finding which choices to make from the CCS into the problem of solving a system of k linear equations in k unknowns, which can be done very efficiently using existing tools such as Gaussian elimination [1, Appendix A], [32] . This is shown in Fig. 5 for k = 2 where we compute the CCS by finding a 2 2 collision using random two-block messages. Then, we have a choice to choose either
from the first two-block collision and either H [3] ⊕ H [4] or H * [3] ⊕ H [4] from the second two-block collision of the CCS to control 2 bits of the checksum without changing the hash value after the CCS.
Defeating XOR checksums in hash functions
We now explain how to defeat the XOR checksum of 3C. Let C t be the desired value of the checksum.
Algorithm.
1. Build a CCS for 3C by constructing a 2 n -collision consisting of two-block ordinary collisions on the underlying MD construction. 
This equation can be seen as a set of n binary equations treating each bit of C t individually. That yields n linear equations in n unknowns, which can be solved using Gaussian elimination. 3 Complexity. It requires n(2 n/2+1 ) evaluations of the compression function to construct the CCS and around n 3 XORs to solve n equations using Gaussian elimination (memory requirements are negligible). In comparison, searching the CCS using the meet-in-the-middle attack requires 2 n/2+1 XORs and about 2 n/2+1 memory.
Remark 2 Similarly, XOR checksums can be defeated in F-Hash and 3CM. If an XOR checksum is computed using both message blocks and intermediate hash values, linear equations due to the XOR of the intermediate hash values
and those of message blocks need to be solved.
Defeating additive checksums
Consider an additive checksum mod 2 d computed using messages for a MD hash function. It is possible to build a CCS as building it for XOR checksums, but both its construction and its use require some different techniques.
Building a CCS with free choice of message blocks
When the collision-finding algorithm is simply brute-force collision search, we can build a CCS for the complexity required to construct a 2 d -collision. Using the CCS to control the checksum then requires negligible work.
In this algorithm, we construct a 2 d -collision, in which each ordinary collision is two message blocks long. We choose the two-block messages in the collisions in such a way that the additive difference between the pair of twoblock messages in each collision is a different power of two. The result is a CCS in which the first collision allows us to add 2 0 to the checksum, the next allows us to add 2 1 , the next 2 2 , and so on up to 2 d−1 . This means that the checksum is entirely controlled 4 . In the following, arithmetic on message blocks is to be interpreted modulo 2 d .
Algorithm. Constructing the CCS.
Let h = H [0].
For i = 1 to d:
(a) Let A, B be two random message blocks. 
Searching the CCS for the message M[1] M[2] · · · M[2d]
that produces the right checksum is done as follows (assume the generic attack fixed the checksum C t ).
Algorithm. Searching the CCS. 
At the end of this process, M contains a sequence of 2d message blocks which, when put into the appropriate place in the message, will force the checksum to the desired value.
Complexity: Constructing the CCS requires about d2 n/2+2
work. Searching the CCS for the right message takes a negligible amount of time and memory. For the specific parameters of the GOST hash, the total work is about 256 · 2 130 = 2 138 .
(The same CCS could be used for many different messages.) In comparison, searching the generically constructed CCS on GOST using meet-in-the-middle attack requires about 2 129 addition operations.
Generic attacks on checksum-based hash functions
In this section, we describe how to adapt generic attacks on the MD hash functions to the checksum-based hash functioñ H = H (m C(m)). For each of these attacks, we illustrate the attack onH whose checksum function is invertible in time T = 2 160 and on MD2, GOST and 3C-SHA-256 whose checksum functions are invertible in time T = 1.
Second preimage attack
Using the CCS, we can defeat the checksum in the hash constructionH to carry out the second preimage attack of [14] . The method is as follows: we first process the given target message withH and store all the intermediate hash values and checksum values. To find the second preimage forH , we first construct an expandable message on the hash function H using a suitable method from [14] then construct the CCS from the end of the expandable message. We carry out the second preimage attack from the end of the CCS, and then we expand the expandable message to make up for all the blocks skipped by the attack. Finally, we search the CCS to find the message which results in the right checksum. Then, we are able to produce a second preimage of the same length as the target message, and with the same checksum. In algorithmic form, the attack works as follows.
Algorithm. Assume m = m[1] · · · m[t]
is the given target message of length t ≈ 2 k message blocks. Assume that C is invertible in time T = 2 τ . 
Complexity. It takes about k2 n/2 evaluations of the compression function f to construct the expandable message of size from k up to 2 k blocks using the generic expandable message algorithm [14] . If fixed points can be easily found for f , then the expandable message may be produced in time about 2 n/2 [4, 14] . Constructing the CCS takes an expected time of d2 n/2 . It takes 2 n−k evaluations of the compression function f to find the linking block. The time required to search the CCS is at most 2 d . The total complexity is then about k2 n/2 + d2 n/2 + 2 n−k ≈ 2 n−k evaluations of the compression function f and at most 2 d evaluations of the checksum function.
The expandable message and the CCS can be precomputed and stored before the long target message is given. The expandable message of size at most 2 k blocks constructed using the generic method of [14] requires memory of size about 2 k . If the expandable message is constructed using fixed points [4, 14] [14] on SHA-256. Hence, using SHA-1 as a checksum function for SHA-256 provides no additional security compared to SHA-256 against the long-message second preimage attack.
Example 2
The above attack is also applicable to MD2 [12] which uses a non-linear checksum function with a 128-bit state computed over message blocks. Unlike MD hash functions, MD2 does not use MD strengthening, and it processes messages of any length. Given a target message of 2 64 blocks, the above attack can be used to find a second preimage for MD2 in about 2 71 evaluations of its compression function. Memory requirements of the attack are on the order of 2 64 . In comparison, a recently published cryptanalytic second preimage attack [16] has time and memory complexity around 2 73 . In both attacks, the complexity due to evaluations of the checksum function is negligible compared to the total complexity.
Example 3
The 256-bit GOST hash function uses a mod 2 256 additive checksum computed over message blocks and hashes messages up to 2 256 bits. For a really long target message of 2 128 256-bit blocks, our second preimage attack on GOST requires 2 138 evaluations of its compression function. Note that this complexity is due to the construction of the CCS. This is also equal to the complexity required to construct the CCS for GOST by controlling message blocks as demonstrated in Sect. 5.2. The attack requires about 2 128 memory.
Similarly, the complexity to find a second preimage for 3C-SHA-256 for a given target message of 2 55 blocks is 2 201 evaluations of the SHA-256 compression function and about 2 24 XOR operations when the CCS is constructed and searched using the algorithm in Sect. 5.1. Memory requirements of the attack are about 2 55 .
Herding attack
We describe the herding attack on the checksum-based hash constructionH (m) = H (m C(m)). The attack consists of two phases: a precomputation phase and an online phase.
Algorithm.
Precomputation phase: H dia left. These collisions have the structure of a binary tree and resemble a diamond. 4. Choose some fixed checksum value C t and compute the hash value
Online phase: Note that in order to account for the MD strengthening, the length of the final message must be fixed already in the precomputation phase.
Complexity. The precomputation phase has complexity roughly 2 n/2+k/2+2 evaluations of the compression function. The complexity of the online phase is the following. Constructing the CCS requires about d2 n/2 evaluations of f . Searching the CCS and through the linking block and diamond to find a message which equals the published hash value take time at most (k + 1)2 τ + 2 (d+τ )/2 . Finding the linking message takes time about 2 n−k . With k ≈ n/3, the two phases have similar complexity when the checksum is not taken into account. The checksum may add to this complexity if the checksum function is large or one-way. As an example, with d 2n/3, the additional complexity is negligible, even if C is one-way. If C is efficiently invertible, then the additional complexity is negligible even with d < 4n/3. Memory requirements are about 2 k+1 + 2 (d−τ )/2+1 (or 2 k+1 if the techniques of Sect. 5 can be used to search the CCS).
Example 4 When our herding attack is applied toH with k = n/3 ≈ 85, the complexity of the attack is about 2 160 + 2 160 + 85 × 2 160 ≈ 2 167 evaluations of the SHA-1 compression function and 2 172 evaluations of SHA-256 compression function. Since the number of evaluations of the checksum function is much lower than the number of evaluations of the compression function, the complexity of the attack onH is roughly the same as the complexity of the herding attack on SHA-256 [13] . The attack requires about 2 86 memory.
Example 5
The herding attack may also be applied to MD2. Since the MD2 checksum function is invertible in time T = 1, and d = n, the additional work due to the checksum is negligible. Hence, for a diamond width of k = 42, the herding attack on MD2 takes about 2 87 evaluations of the compression function in both the precomputation and online phases. The attack requires around 2 65 memory. 
Multicollisions in checksum-based hash functions
The CCS used in the second preimage and herding attacks can also be used to construct multicollisions on hash functions using checksums. In this section, we show some better algorithms to find multicollisions in these hash functions without the need for constructing and searching the CCS.
Application of Joux' collision attack on the cascaded construction
Since a checksum-based hash function may be viewed as a cascaded construction [27] followed by a "merging" of the two chains, Joux's collision attack [11] on the cascaded construction applies to all checksum-based hash functions. Such a collision can be used to construct multicollisions. A 2 k -collision attack onH can be carried out as follows.
1. For i from 1 to k do:
(a) Starting from C iv , find a 2 n/2 -collision on the checksum chain. Let the common checksum value be C * . (b) Use brute-force search to find a collision on the hash chain among the 2 n/2 messages in the multicollision on the checksum chain.
Complexity. The complexity of the attack, when Joux's method to find multicollisions is used in Step 1a, is k ×n/2× 2 d/2 + k × 2 n/2 . Memory requirements are around 2 n/2 .
Note that in the above 2 n -collision attack, we make no assumptions on the checksum function, nor on the compression function, except that we assume they take about the same time to evaluate. Hence, the roles of the two functions may be switched, so we may instead first find a 2 d -collision on the hash chain, and then brute force a collision on the checksum chain. The complexity is then
Example 7
The above attack onH has complexity about k × 2 87 + k × 2 128 ≈ k × 2 128 (and about 2 128 memory). This may be compared with the complexity of about k × 2 128 for the attack on SHA-256.
Using an easily linkable checksum function
If it is easy to link the checksum function C inH then multicollisions can be found forH with complexity independent of d. Assume linking can be done in time T = 2 τ . Then, we can find a 2 k -collision as follows: Complexity. Computing the checksum function 2 n/2 times in the forward direction takes 2 n/2 time. Linking the checksum function 2 n/2 times takes time T 2 n/2 . The brute-force collision attack on the hash chain takes time 2 n/2+1 , since we need to process two message blocks. The total complexity to find a collision is therefore about (T + 1)2 n/2 evaluations of C and 2 n/2+1 evaluations of the compression function f . We repeat this k times to obtain a 2 k -collision. The total complexity is k(T + 1)2 n/2 evaluations of C and k × 2 n/2+1 evaluations of f . Memory requirements are about 2 n/2 . The messages in the multicollision are of 2k blocks each. 
Remark 4
If the checksum is computed using intermediate hash values as in 3C-SHA-256, then every 1-block collision on the hash chain would also result in a 1-block collision on the checksum chain. Hence, a 2 k -collision can be constructed on such a checksum-based hash function in k × 2 n/2 compression function evaluations.
Remark 5 Mironov and Narayanan (personal communication at CRYPTO'06, August 2006) observed that on the MD hash functions that use XOR checksums using message blocks, a 2 k -collision attack can be constructed by repeating the same message block twice in every individual collision. This trick can be seen as a special case of our multicollision attack on the MD hashes that use easily linkable checksum function. We note that their trick does not work on the iterated hash functions that use simple non-linear checksums as in MD2.
Application of our attacks to cascaded hash functions
Since the second preimage, herding and multicollision attacks described in the previous sections span both the hash chain and the checksum chain, they can also be applied to some cascaded constructions [27] . Hence, our attacks on the constructionH are also applicable to the cascaded construc- 7.1 Comparison with the results of Joux [11] In [11] , Joux showed that with respect to collision and (second) preimage attacks, a cascade of two hash functions is no more secure than the stronger hash function in the cascade. In the following, we provide complexities of our longmessage second preimage attack on some cascaded hash functions for a given target message of 2 55 blocks and compare them with the work of [11] . While the second preimage attack of [11] on SHA256(m) SHA1(m) requires about 2 256 evaluations of SHA-256 and 2 160 evaluations of SHA-1, our attack requires about 2 201 evaluations of SHA-256 and 2 160 evaluations of SHA-1, effectively the same as the complexity of the long-message second preimage attack of [14] on SHA-256 itself. In some cases, however, the weakest hash function affects the complexity. For example, while the second preimage attack of Joux [11] on SHA1(m) MD5(m) requires 2 160 evaluations of SHA-1 and 2 128 evaluations of MD5, our attack needs 2 105 evaluations of SHA-1 and 2 128 evaluations of MD5. If H and G are of equal strengths, then our second preimage attack is slightly better than the attack of [11] . See Table 4 for some illustrations. It is important to note that the complexities of our second preimage attacks on the cascaded hashes correspond to those applied to impractically long messages of 2 55 512-bit blocks unlike those of [11] . Also, memory requirements are around 2 n/2 , where n is the output size of the largest hash function in the cascade. Dunkelman and Preneel [5] analysed more general iterated hash functions called "concatenated" hashing schemes in [5] against herding and multicollision attacks. In this class of hash functions, the compression function can be expressed as two or "more" data paths wherein the first path is not affected by the other paths, the second path may be affected by the first path but not by the other remaining paths and so on. The checksum-based iterated hash functions analysed in our paper are special cases of the concatenated (multipath) iterated hash functions studied in [5] . Hence, the herding and multicollision attack of [5] also applies to the checksumbased hash functions.
Herding attack
Our herding attack on the cascaded or checksum-based hash functions is not faster than that of Dunkelman and Preneel [5] whose complexity in the pre-processing phase is 2 n/2+k/2 + (d/2 − k/2)2 d/2+k/2 and in the online phase is
When their attack is applied toH with k = n/3 ≈ 85, the total complexity is 2 172 . The complexity of our attack is 2 167 + 2 172 . The reason for similar complexities is that the attacks are dominated by the complexity to find the message to link to the precomputed diamond structure. This comparison holds even when the checksum function is easily invertible or linkable (i.e., T = 1). In some cases, the herding attack of Dunkelman and Preneel [5] is more efficient than ours; in particular when the two hash functions in the cascade have the same size. For example, to herd the cascaded hash function SHA1(m) RIPEMD160(m) where n = d = 160 bits and for k = 54, the online phase of the attack of [5] requires approximately 2 113 . Our attack requires more than 2 160 . The reason is that the attack of [5] is dominated by the precomputed stage, whereas ours is dominated by the online stage which has the complexity d
The exception to the above comparison is the application of the herding attack on the checksum-based hash functions with short hash values and whose checksum is easily invertible (i.e., T = 1) such as the MD2 hash function. As noted before, on MD2 with k = 42, the complexity of our attack is about 2 87 . The complexity of the attack of [5] is about 2 92 .
Multicollision
The complexity to find 2 k -collisions in hash functions based on general checksum functions (e.g., one-way checksums) using the result of Dunkelman and Preneel [5] combined with Joux' attack [11] is approximately:
then the attacks will have the same complexity. Therefore, for the general checksum functions with large d (close to n), the complexity of our multicollision attack is approximately the same as that of the attack using the method of [5] . For hash functions based on an easily linkable checksum function, the complexity of our attack approximates to k × 2 n/2 and hence is more efficient than that of [5] . For example, the complexity of our attack to find 2 k -collisions on MD2 is k ×2 65 , whereas the attack of [5] requires k × 2 70 .
On carrying out generic attacks using cryptanalytic collision attacks
We note that it is difficult to construct the CCS using cryptanalytic collision-finding algorithms such as the ones built on MD5 and SHA-1 [34, 35] . . , t on the underlying MD of 3C based on the near collisions due to the first blocks in each pair of the messages. Usually, the XOR differences of the nearly collided intermediate hash values are either fixed or very tightly constrained as in the collision attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 [34, 35] . It is difficult to construct a CCS due to the inability to control these fixed or constrained bits. Similarly, it is also difficult to build the CCS using colliding blocks of the form [33] as this form produces a zero XOR difference in the checksum after every two-block collision. Similarly, cryptanalytic collision attacks on the compression functions often do not help in carrying out generic attacks on the hashes that use non-linear checksums. Though we cannot perform generic attacks on the hash functions that use linear checksums using structured collisions, we can find multiblock collisions by concatenating two structured collisions. Consider a one-block collisionfinding algorithm for the GOST hash function H . A call to this collision finder results in a pair of b-bit message blocks (m [1] . This is a collision in the additive checksum chain.
Conclusion and open problems
Simple and fast checksums have been considered for a long time as possible methods of complicating many attacks on hash functions.
The attacks of this paper show that many such checksumbased hash functions are vulnerable to generic attacks on the iterated hash functions that do not depend on the intrinsic properties of the components. It was shown that such attacks are possible even in the cases where the checksum function is assumed to be ideal in the sense that inverting it can only be done in a brute-force manner. Also, even if the checksum function is as strong as the compression function, multicollision attacks are still applicable. Previous results [5] have shown that also herding attacks can be applied. These combined results show that the checksum function in a hash function must be very strong if it is to provide any additional security, and hence it is also likely to result in a severe reduction in efficiency. Thus, checksum functions do not seem to provide the best protection for hash functions against generic attacks. Better alternatives seem to be to continuously mix the outputs of two different functions, such as the double pipe scheme of Lucks [19] .
It is also fair to note that a checksum may still be a good way of protecting against shortcut attacks. As an example, although there is a theoretical collision attack on the full MD2 hash function [16] , the real complexity of the attack might be greater than the birthday complexity (due to large memory requirements). When the checksum is omitted, however, there is a very efficient collision attack on MD2 [30] .
Our study on the security of checksum-based hash functions leaves a number of questions open. Among these, the most interesting is, whether there are faster methods of circumventing checksums than the use of a checksum control sequence. Another question is how to develop efficient checksum control sequences to defeat simple non-linear checksums such as the ones in MD2 similar to the ones constructed to defeat linear checksums. It is also an interesting research problem to improve the 1024-block collision attack on the GOST hash function [20] to a two-block collision attack as described in this paper using the collision attack on the compression function [20] . Another possible research area is to construct alternative simple and efficient extensions to the MD construction that provide protection against all generic attacks.
